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FOLLOWING the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse 
of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe,2 Western governments em-
barked on an ambitious project to support the transitions to democ-
racy in those countries. At that time, the idea of civil society as critical 
to development, democratization, and successful transition became 
prominent among Western donors and policymakers. This was due 
to the growing disillusion of Western governments and donors with 
state-led development and the ascendancy of the neoliberal paradigm 
of New Public Management, which supported the rollback of the state 
and the privatization of social-service delivery. Some Western poli-
cymakers believed that by supporting and strengthening civil society 
“democratic forms” could be transformed into “democratic substance.”3 
In this context, civil society promotion became a new mantra in both 
aid and diplomatic circles4 and led to the extraordinary growth of NGOs 
worldwide.
Based on extensive fieldwork5 in Armenia—including participant 
observation, formal interviews with women’s rights and human rights 
NGO leaders, representatives of donor organizations, government of-
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ficials, academics, and journalists—as well as analysis of NGO, Armenian 
press, and donor publications, in this article I examine the impact of civil 
society strengthening efforts in Armenia since 1991. I argue that in Ar-
menia, as in other post-Soviet countries, Cold War ideologies strongly 
influenced and shaped the design and implementation of policies and 
practices in the area of civil society strengthening in the 1990s. These 
Cold War ideologies engendered the notion that everything created prior 
to the collapse of Communism was either “not true civil society” or that 
it was polluted and contaminated by the Communist legacy and had 
to be purged before true civil society and democracy could flourish.6 I 
maintain that in Armenia these beliefs supported the promotion of a par-
ticular model of civil society, which I refer to as a genetically engineered 
civil society, characterized by the extraordinary growth in the number of 
NGOs ( from 44 registered NGOs in 1994 to more than 4,500 in 2008). This 
genetically engineered civil society, with the injection of foreign fund-
ing (growth hormones), underwent spectacularly rapid growth, which 
would have not occurred organically. Similar to genetically modified 
crops, this genetically engineered civil society also began to colonize and 
squeeze out all indigenous competitors, becoming the dominant type 
in its environment. In the process, civil society was reduced to profes-
sionalized service delivery or advocacy NGOs. I do not deny that NGOs 
are important institutional actors within civil society, but they are only 
a subset of civil society. Other civil society actors include trade unions, 
faith-based organizations, grassroots and informal associations, self-help 
groups, and others. Thus, the post-Soviet Armenian civic universe today 
is populated by several thousand advocacy and service-delivery NGOs 
that largely owe their existence to Western donors. It most certainly is a 
vibrant NGO sector; a vibrant civil society it is not.
I argue that this “NGOization” has led to the depoliticization and 
taming of the emancipatory potential of civil society. That potential, I 
maintain, is one of the most important elements of civil society in that 
it provides a space for discussion, debate, and the challenging of hege-
monic discourses that are essential components in democracies. If the 
emancipatory dimension is diluted or tamed, civil society loses one of 
its most important purposes, which is “the freedom to imagine that the 
world could be different.”7
In the next section, I examine how a concept as elusive and difficult 
to define as civil society became a central part of international donor 
policymaking.
The Repackaging of an Elusive Concept into Policy
Although he did not use the term civil society,8 Alexis de Tocqueville was 
the first to attribute the importance of “associationalism” and self-orga-
nization for democracy.9 In the late twentieth century, de Tocqueville’s 
work became popular among some American scholars, including Rob-
ert Putnam, Francis Fukuyama, and Larry Diamond, and it was subse-
quently influential in US policy circles. The neo-Tocquevillian position 
is that democracy is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigor-
ous civil society10 and that successful transitions to democracy are pos-
sible only if civil society or “something like it” either predates the tran-
sition or is established in the course of a transition from authoritarian 
rule.11 For many neo-Tocquevillian scholars, the assumption that civil 
society has a positive and beneficial influence on democracy is a given. 
Putnam, for instance, refers to civil society organizations as “schools 
for democracy.”12 Diamond meanwhile argues that civil society not only 
checks and limits the power of the state but also strengthens and legiti-
mates democracy.13 The belief that civil society is a bulwark against the 
“monstrous state,”14 “unaccountable and unresponsive leaders,”15 and a 
counterweight to state power16 supported the emphasis on civil society 
promotion in US foreign aid programs and what some describe as the 
“democracy aid industry.”17
In this article I focus mostly on US-led civil society strengthening 
and democracy promotion efforts, because although democratization 
is by no means a new departure for the European Union or European 
bilateral donors, as Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs argue, the US 
began focusing more systematically on democratization slightly earlier 
than the EU and the effective coordination of EU democracy promo-
tion efforts has been conspicuously absent.18 They maintain that until 
the late 1990s the lack of mechanisms for marrying national initiatives 
to overall common guidelines on democracy still presented a serious 
challenge to effective concerted European action.19 Discussions on 
transatlantic democracy-building efforts intensified following Septem-
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ber 11,20 but as Jeffrey Kopstein points out, following the war in Iraq 
many European leaders and the European public remain suspicious of 
democracy promotion, interpreting it as “a repackaged commitment to 
the unilateral use of force as well as justification for war and occupa-
tion.”21 Moreover, there is relatively less focus on civil society as a key 
pillar of democracy promotion among European bilateral and multi-
lateral donors than among US donors. Indeed, organizations such as 
the US National Endowment for Democracy that focus heavily on civil 
society promotion were described as “pushy” by some respondents in 
a report by the FRIDE think tank (Fundación para las Relaciones Inter-
nacionales y el Diálogo Exterior).22
Though some Europeans might consider American-led efforts as 
“pushy,” since the early 1990s civil society assistance has been “a cen-
terpiece of America’s international outreach”23 and “a matter of prin-
ciple.”24 In fact, since the early 1990s, civil society assistance has been at 
the top of all sub-sectors of USAID democracy assistance.25 From 1990 
to 2003, the bulk of USAID democracy assistance was sent to countries 
in Eurasia ($5.77 million), with the lowest levels of aid going to Africa 
($1.29 million) and Asia ($1.29 million).26 US-funded civil society assis-
tance was largely directed at NGOs, as the USAID position in the early 
1990s was to provide “vigorous” support for local NGOs, which would 
“be a critical element of strengthening civil society.”27 The assumption 
that “a strong civil society is desirable and makes democratic practices 
and traditions more likely to flourish”28 persists; as current US Vice-
President Joseph Biden stated in the 2006 Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearing on NGOs, “we must understand that an election 
does not a democracy make.…A democracy must rest on the founda-
tion of a strong civil society.”29 [Emphasis added.]
But the US was not always so interested in civil society. On the con-
trary, during the Cold War, civil society was viewed with suspicion and, 
at that time, maintaining political stability and warding off the spread 
of communism were key preoccupations in American foreign policy. In 
the late 1960s and 1970s, “overly active” societies were seen as being 
potentially harmful for democracy.30 As Nancy Bermeo writes, “Rather 
than being portrayed as the possible savior of democracy, civil soci-
ety was often cast in the role of spoiler: it was portrayed as sometimes 
asking too much—as spoiling the chances for democracy’s survival.”31 
Samuel Huntington, for example, wrote about the dangers of politicized 
social forces and their ability to not only dominate the agenda but also 
disrupt political stability. He noted the difference between “institu-
tionalized societies” in which organized civil society reduced tensions 
and “praetorian societies” in which civil society exacerbated it. Hun-
tington argued that an “excess of democracy” and “increased popular 
participation” could erode a government’s capacity to deal with issues. 
32 He insisted that political institutions must come to dominate these 
“raw social forces” in order to maintain the stability of society.33 Other 
scholars, meanwhile, saw the danger for rent-seeking by civil society 
groups34 and the threat that such groups posed to the governability of 
democracies through their disproportionate influence on policymak-
ing.35 Although these arguments largely fell out of favor when the Cold 
War ended, some scholars still critically interrogate the unquestioning 
tendency to associate the presence of an active civil society with the 
emergence of a democratic order. Some argue that democracy can be 
weakened by civil society,36 while others contend that the nature of civil 
society is far more important than the existence of civil society alone.37 
I concur with the latter view.
Even though these critics raise important questions and challenges 
for the normative view of civil society, it was the normative, neo-Toc-
quevillian model that was most influential among policymakers and 
donors in the 1990s. When conducting interviews with US-based do-
nors in Armenia, I was struck by the fact that none of the respondents 
from donor agencies engaged in democracy-promotion programs 
ever questioned whether civil society should be strengthened as part 
of their democracy-promotion efforts; the question was always how it 
could best be done.
It should be recalled, however, that while this normative model was 
popular among donors, in Latin America and Eastern Europe intellec-
tuals, dissidents, and activists were far more inspired and influenced by 
the ideas of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, civil society 
was more than political economy, and he questioned the economism of 
the Marxist definition and went on to invert Marx’s vision by arguing 
that ideologies come before institutions and that ideology is the force 
14 15(Re)Cl aiming Emancipatory Potential of Civil Societ yArmine Ishkanian
capable of shaping new histories.38 Gramsci placed the emphasis on 
civil society’s politically relevant cultural dimension39 and considered 
civil society as the space for the (re)production and contestation of 
hegemonic as well as counter-hegemonic discourses. In both Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, civil society referred to autonomy and self-
organization, with an emphasis on withdrawal from the state and the 
creation instead of “islands of civic engagement.”40 In Eastern Europe 
in particular, civil society activists hoped that following the collapse of 
communism civil society would provide the means for sustaining indi-
vidual freedom and empowerment in a modern mass society, thereby 
keeping liberal democracy reinvigorated and honest.41 However, as the 
transitions in Eastern Europe progressed, the radical democratic ideas 
and visions dissipated, giving way to more-established and less revo-
lutionary ones. In the former Soviet states, where the debates around 
civil society had not yet developed to the same extent when the com-
munist system collapsed, the dissipation of the visions for reform oc-
curred even more rapidly.
Debating the Existence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and began instituting the 
reforms of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), many 
Western Sovietologists, particularly those who subscribed to the totali-
tarian school of thought, were caught off guard and were unable to ana-
lyze the impact of those reforms.42 Those scholars used Arendt’s theory 
of totalitarianism as a theoretical framework for understanding the 
Soviet system.43 They believed that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian 
state in which all dissent and life was controlled by the state. The rise of 
independent movements and organizations in the 1980s not only chal-
lenged Soviet bureaucratic rule, but also the perceptions of these Sovi-
etologists who had viewed the Soviet state as an immutable monolith. 
Indeed, many Sovietologists believed that perestroika was another tem-
porary thaw, such as the earlier Khrushchevian thaw of the 1960s, and 
would sooner or later be followed by a freeze. As Moshe Lewin writes, 
“Although Western observers admit that things look extremely promis-
ing, they are rather skeptical, if not baffled, for many, among whom the 
US specialists are the most influential, do not believe that the USSR can 
produce meaningful social, economic or political change.”44 This com-
mitment to totalitarianism as an ideological explanation meant that 
most Western perceptions of the Soviet Union were hampered by a cog-
nitive schema that prevented seeing the world in a realistic way.
One such scholar, Alfred Evans, argues that civil society did not ex-
ist in the Soviet Union. He writes, “Most scholars have agreed that civil 
society as usually defined by Western theoretical approaches, did not 
exist in the Soviet Union.”45 Evans argues that there were no organiza-
tions that were free from state or party control and that even the infor-
mal groups that emerged in Russia in the late 1980s had “shallow roots” 
and their existence did not lead to “the birth of organizations formed 
by the initiative of citizens and drawing on society’s independent re-
sources.”46 While citing the dissident movement, Evans contends that 
these dissidents were “isolated” from the population and viewed as 
reckless dissenters whom people feared associating with.47 Evans’s defi-
nition of civil society is very narrow and largely refers to professional-
ized advocacy or service-delivery NGOs. It was also the definition, as I 
noted earlier, that was embraced by Western donors in the early 1990s.
Certainly, if we apply such a narrow definition of civil society, then 
it is easy to claim that there was no civil society in the Soviet Union and 
that civil society had to be created from scratch. However, that narrow 
perspective ignores the multitude of voluntary groups and informal 
associations that were emerging in some Soviet republics beginning 
in the mid 1980s. Lewin (1988) contends that civil society in the late 
Soviet period was not only an effect of Gorbachev’s policies but also, 
more importantly, the cause for the introduction of the policies of per-
estroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). Henry Huttenbach, 
meanwhile, points to the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the 
Life of Ivan Denisovich, public demonstrations on the pollution of Lake 
Baikal, and calls by ethnic groups for the right to return to ancestral 
homelands (e.g., Crimean Tatars) or to emigrate (Jews, Armenians, and 
Germans) as trends that increased in the late 1970s and 1980s, leading 
up to Gorbachev’s reforms. He cites them as evidence of a “proto-or pre-
civil society in the making.”48 Russian human rights activist Ludmilla 
Alexeyeva writes in a 1990 Helsinki Watch report, titled Civil Society 
in the USSR, that the informal associations (nyeformalniye obyediny-
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eniya) were “sowing the seeds of democracy” and that the emergence 
of the informal associations was facilitated rather than mandated by 
Gorbachev:
The wave of spontaneous civic energy and self-expression that gave 
birth to many of the Soviet informal associations is one that Gorbachev 
released rather than ordained. Not the product of an official initiative, it 
is the response from below to the relaxation of pressure from above.49
Russian writer and dissident Boris Kagarlitsky, meanwhile, de-
scribes the efforts of students protesting the demolition of historical 
buildings, the rehabilitations of political prisoners and exiles, the in-
tensifying publishing of samizdat (clandestine publication), and the 
election of “wrong candidates.” Kagarlitsky argues that changes were 
already occurring in the Soviet system in the 1980s and that the year 
1986 marked the “golden age” of perestroika when the “life of society 
was reviving.”50 Interestingly, some authors use biological terms, such 
as “embryonic,” “vestigial,” or “germs,” to describe the nascent develop-
ment stage of civil society in the Soviet Union in the 1980s.51 But, to be 
clear, no one writing in the late 1980s or 1990s went so far as to claim 
that a vibrant civil society had already emerged in the Soviet Union.
Civil Society in Armenia before Independence
In the South Caucasus, Armenia enjoyed the greatest official tolerance. 
It was Moscow’s showpiece to the world, to prove that religious freedom 
prevailed in the USSR. Not only were Armenian churches functioning in 
the 1980s but centuries-old monasteries and chapels were being reno-
vated; moreover, there were social clubs and societies, such as compa-
triotic unions, that helped maintain Armenian national identity. There 
was the “duality of life” under the Soviet Union in Armenia; that duality, 
Razmik Panossian contends, consisted of the official acceptance of the 
Soviet/Marxist line alongside the perpetuation of nationalist ideolo-
gies.52 Despite the political limits placed by the Soviet regime, Arme-
nians managed to develop a “degree of autonomy and self-expression” 
under Soviet rule.53 Abrahamian maintains that the “embryos of civil 
society”54 were present in Armenia in the late 1980s. To illustrate, he 
refers to the emergence of the information tables (stoliki) that sprung 
up in Theatre Square in central Yerevan in 1988, describing them as pro-
moters of change and the “germs” (i.e., seeds) of civil society. The sto-
liki were places where people could receive written or oral information 
about elections, deputies, registration rules, electoral and polling dis-
tricts, and many other details about the constitutional rights of Soviet 
citizens from those versed in Soviet constitutional law.55 He maintains 
that in 1988 Armenians “began their education in democracy” and in 
several months there were many people who would use the constitu-
tion to legally win a number of electoral campaigns:
The members of these groups were at the same time the first agitators 
of the campaigns. Without their scrupulous and routine work the move-
ment would hardly have won the first and following elections. The tables 
disappeared when the festival ended and have not been seen since.56
At the peak of the Karabakh Movement, in November 1988, the 
movement leaders, informed by Soviet constitutional law, collected the 
required number of deputies’ signatures to have the right to call an ex-
traordinary session of the Supreme Soviet. Although the Communist 
authorities banned the session, the movement defied them and called 
an alternative extraordinary session, to be held in Theatre Square on 
24 November 1988. According to Abrahamian, the deputies were asked 
to gather at the Opera House in the Theatre Square. When some depu-
ties failed to turn up, the “hunt for deputies” began. The people in the 
movement, Abrahamian argues, were absolutely convinced that when 
a legitimate session was called the deputies should not refuse to par-
ticipate in it. Demonstrators from the square went to the homes and 
offices of the absentee deputies and compelled them, sometimes even 
dragging them kicking and screaming, into the Opera House, where 
they were obliged to carry out their duties as representatives of the So-
viet Armenian people.57
While the stoliki and other nonviolent demonstrations and actions 
led by the leaders of the Karabakh Movement and the demonstrators 
in the square prompted the authorities to declare a state of emergency 
and to arrest the Movement’s leaders in late November 1988, nonethe-
less an important event had occurred and inspired people’s faith in de-
mocracy. Abrahamian writes, “The communist authorities seemed to be 
so shocked by the people’s rapidly increasing legislative experience that 
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they failed to create some effective illegal preventive structures to resist 
their activity.”58 It is important to remember that the stoliki emerged 
without the capacity-building or civic-education grants that have be-
come common in the post-Soviet period. On the contrary, the stoliki 
were local efforts at self-education and empowerment that disappeared 
in the post-Soviet period. Abrahamian ends by describing how the car-
nival or festival civil society that had blossomed in 1988 vanished once 
independence was achieved and the time for nation-building ensued. 
He adds, “After independence, which was in a sense an offspring of the 
festival in the square, one of the first parliamentary sessions of the new 
republic reasserted the resolutions of its festive progenitor, thus taking 
upon itself the difficult task of constructing, step by step, a real, and not 
a festive, civil society in Armenia.”59
On 21 September 1991, Armenia declared independence from the 
Soviet Union. The post-independence period was complicated by the 
conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, the ensuing block-
ade initiated by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the influx of some 400,000 
ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan who had fled pogroms in 
Sumgait, Baku, and elsewhere. The situation was worsened by the col-
lapse of the economy, skyrocketing inflation, the rapid implementation 
of privatization reforms and austerity measures, including limits on 
state spending and subsidies, which were part of the so-called shock 
therapies introduced by the international financial institutions. There 
was mass unemployment and impoverishment, and the blockade led to 
long blackouts, stoppage of state-provided heat and hot water services, 
and closures of factories, schools, and research institutes. In northern 
Armenia, the already difficult situation was exacerbated by the fact 
that the authorities had to deal with the tens of thousands of people 
who were wounded and left homeless after the 7 December 1988 earth-
quake that left 25,000 people dead and virtually destroyed the cities of 
Leninakan (now Gyumri) and Spitak.
Given these harsh socioeconomic conditions in the early post-Sovi-
et years, most people did not have the time or inclination to participate 
in civic projects; the civic activism that had become a part of Armenian 
life in the late 1980s was replaced by disillusion, apathy, frustration, 
and dislocation in the 1990s. As in Soviet times, the extended family 
remained the primary mode of social protection and form of identi-
fication and advancement.60 The political turmoil and socioeconomic 
hardships that followed independence led to the devaluation of democ-
racy and to a re-evaluation of the ideas and goals of 1988.
When I began my fieldwork in Armenia in 1996, Armenia and Azer-
baijan had signed a cease-fire over the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and 
daily life was returning to a more normal state as electricity was avail-
able 24 hours a day and the economic situation, although still difficult, 
was slowly improving. In 1996, the USAID-funded Armenian Assembly 
of America NGO Training and Resource Center (NGOC) in Yerevan was 
in its second year of operation. The opening of the NGOC was the wa-
tershed event in the development of Armenia’s NGO sector because it 
provided Armenians with a template for how to create an NGO and 
how to seek funding from donors in order to sustain that NGO.61 When 
the NGOC opened in 1994, there were only 44 local NGOs registered 
with the Armenian Ministry of Justice; by 1996, there were more than 
1,500. As of June 2009, there were more 4,500 registered NGOs. Consid-
ering that Armenia has a population of 3.2 million, that is a very large 
number. The NGOs that attended the NGOC educational and training 
seminars not only learned how to write grant proposals and how to 
approach donors but also, most importantly, began to master “NGO-
speak.” Although NGOs must register to become legally operational, 
there is no requirement for them to cancel their registration when they 
cease operating. Hence, the large numbers are not a true reflection of 
the vibrancy of the sector, and most of the work or activism can be as-
cribed to less than 500 NGOs throughout the country.
In the next section I focus on civil society activism connected with 
elections. I argue that this is one area where we are beginning to wit-
ness more organic participation apart from NGO activities that are 
funded and led by donors.
Civil Society after Independence in Armenia
Since the early 1990s, elections have been an important component 
in the democracy-building programs implemented and supported by 
Western donors in the former socialist states in Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. Globally, elections have been used as “bench-
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marks” and “litmus tests”62 in measuring the level of democratization of 
the post-Soviet countries and for assessing the progress that the various 
countries have made in their transitions to democracy. A great deal of 
time and money has been spent training, preparing, as well as observing 
and monitoring elections by donors, intergovernmental organizations, 
and NGOs over the past 15 years in Armenia. Regardless of whether the 
preparations, trainings, and monitoring of elections have had an impact 
in stopping fraud or decreasing the frequency of irregularities, and many 
observers of Armenia’s post-Soviet elections would emphatically argue 
that they have not, a focus on elections remains a key component of the 
democracy-building programs in the twenty-first century.
Robert Pastor argues that most scholars of government would 
agree that elections are essential instruments of democracy and that 
“to many, democracy should be more than free and fair elections, but 
it cannot be less”63 Similarly, Neil Nevitte and Santiago Canton contend 
that free and fair elections are not only a litmus test of a regime’s devo-
tion to democratic values but also provide critical opportunities for vot-
ers to weaken or break the grip of authoritarian governments.64 While 
agreeing that elections are essential for democracies, Jorgen Elklit and 
Palle Svensson problematize the meaning of the phrase “free and fair 
elections,” arguing that there is no single, universal definition or stan-
dard of what constitutes a “free and fair election”65 Given the absence 
of a universal standard, they argue, a vibrant and independent civil so-
ciety, in addition to an independent judiciary, legislature, and media, 
are important components in any democracy.66 Civil society, they add, 
plays a particularly important role in that it helps promote active civic 
participation, the building of social capital and trust, and the existence 
of open spaces for dialogue and debate. This perspective (that democ-
racy includes free and fair elections, vibrant civil society, rule of law, 
etc.) is shared by donors working in Armenia. Beginning with the 2003 
election, and intensifying in each subsequent election (i.e., 2007 par-
liamentary, 2008 presidential elections, 2009 mayoral election), NGOs 
have implemented a number of initiatives in the pre- and post-election 
periods, including supporting civic participation initiatives, raising 
public awareness about defending one’s vote, sponsoring information 
hotlines, and training and serving as local election monitors.
Of the five presidential elections since independence in Armenia, 
only the 1991 election is considered to have met international stan-
dards for free and fair elections. The other four elections appear to fol-
low a pattern that has unfortunately become all too familiar: flawed 
elections67 followed by protests and demonstrations by the opposition.
The most recent presidential election in Armenia, held on 19 Feb-
ruary 2008, was followed by large public demonstrations as supporters 
of the leading defeated candidate (and former president) Levon Ter-
Petrosian responded to the declared outcome by organizing a continu-
ous mass protests in Yerevan’s Liberty Square. The atmosphere at the 
tented encampment was celebratory rather than threatening, typified 
by protestors’ singing and dancing around bonfires. The post-election 
standoff remained very tense and culminated in the violent attacks 
on demonstrators in the morning of 1 March. Following the break-up 
of demonstrations and the violence, the government, led by Robert 
Kocharian, declared a 20-day state of emergency as all events and pub-
lic gatherings were banned and media outlets, including TV and radio 
channels, newspapers, journals, and Internet news sites, were allowed 
to transmit only official communiqués.
Despite Armenia’s commitments to the Council of Europe, on 
March 18 the National Assembly passed amendments to the Law on 
Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, Rallies, and Demonstrations, in-
stituting more-stringent restrictions on public gatherings. One of the 
amendments complemented the clause dealing with cases where au-
thorities have “reliable information” that street protests would pose a 
threat to “state security, public order, public health and morality”; the 
amendment sets forth that any such information coming from the 
Armenian police and the NSS is automatically deemed “reliable.” Ac-
cording to Human Rights Watch, these amendments “are incompatible 
with Armenia’s obligations to respect freedom of assembly under the 
European Convention on Human Rights”68 Despite these restrictions, 
however, and to a large extent in response to them, there was renewed 
civic activism by NGOs, social movements, and other civil society or-
ganizations. What emerged was not simply the activism of NGOs but, 
rather, a whole set of other civic actors, including youth groups and 
women’s groups; moreover, spaces, both real and virtual, were created 
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for debating and discussing political developments. I would argue that 
this is an unprecedented development in Armenia’s post-Soviet history. 
The movement that emerged after the 2008 elections has its roots in 
and clearly identifies itself with the Karabakh Movement of 1988. The 
movement led by Ter-Petrosian and his Armenian National Congress, 
embraced and utilized the Karabakh Movement’s symbols, practices, 
and discourses, including holding meetings in Liberty Square and the 
Matenadaran as well as using particular chants (e.g., “struggle until vic-
tory”) that are associated with the Karabakh Movement.
In the post-election period, some pro-government NGOs attempted 
to convince the opposition demonstrators to stop the protests and to be 
“tolerant,”69 but most of the human rights NGOs claimed they were chal-
lenging the climate of fear that, they argued, had emerged following the 
events of March 1-2, 2008. According to these NGOs, arrests of opposition 
political activists and attacks on high-profile civil society leaders fueled 
the prevailing climate of fear. For instance, following the beating of young 
civil society activist Arsen Kharatyan on May 28, a number of human 
rights and media freedom NGOs wrote in their statement: 
We condemn such actions and declare that the attempts at silencing the 
voices of the people and of creating a climate of fear only serve to inten-
sify dissatisfaction and resentment with the current administration.70
Also following the elections, a number of these human rights NGOs 
began to challenge findings of international observers. For instance, 
when supporters of Serge Sargsyan cited the findings of the Interna-
tional Election Observation Mission (IEOM)71 to argue that the vote met 
international standards, some Armenian NGOs criticized the premise 
of the IEOM report that the election was “administered mostly in line 
with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards.” In 
February 2008, nine human rights and media freedom NGOs72 released 
a statement arguing that “the apparent discrepancy between the actual 
findings of the assessment with the formative first two sentences of the 
report resulted in the government only referring to this paragraph in 
the international observers’ assessment in order to legitimize the re-
sults of the election.”73 At the pickets near the OSCE office in Yerevan, 
demonstrators repeatedly shouted the word “shame” to indicate their 
disappointment with the observers’ report and what they considered 
to be a legitimization of a flawed electoral process.74 NGOs also sent 
open letters to international organizations and foreign governments. 
The letters outlined the various human rights abuses and violations by 
the authorities. In a strongly worded open letter dated March 27, ten 
NGOs75 accused Armenia of Soviet-style repression and “state terror.” 
They wrote: “The scale of such violence increases day-by-day. The Ar-
menian authorities arbitrarily violate constitutional rights and funda-
mental freedoms of the people.”76 Although these letters did not have 
an impact on local political developments, they publicized the various 
human rights violations both domestically and internationally. Glob-
ally, NGOs engage in such activities in an effort to attract international 
attention to domestic human rights violations and repression. Such be-
havior is described to as the “boomerang effect” by which non-state ac-
tors (including NGOs, social movements, etc.) achieve change domesti-
cally by focusing international attention on the state.77
Apart from issuing statements, writing open letters, and engaging 
in protest actions, some Armenian NGOs created a toll-free telephone 
hotline to assist those who were illegally kept in police custody, had 
their homes searched, or felt vulnerable. Hotlines are relatively new in 
Armenia; the first toll-free hotlines (established in 2002), were created 
to support victims of domestic violence.78 These new hotlines received 
large number of calls following the March 1-2 events. The authorities 
and pro-government media outlets subsequently attacked a number of 
NGOs for what they considered unpatriotic behavior, and published ar-
ticles that raised questions about the motivations of those NGO leaders 
and the sources of funding their organizations.79
Apart from the activity of NGOs, other civil society organizations 
and social movements, such as the Azgayin Zartonk (National Awaken-
ing), the Save Armenia Action Group (SAAG), and the group of wives 
of political prisoners, among others, have become active since March 
1-2. A group called Azat Hayer (Free Armenians) issued a letter to Ar-
menians worldwide calling for acts of civil disobedience and boycotts 
of the traditional Diaspora political parties and organizations. Quoting 
Henry David Thoreau and Thomas Jefferson, the authors wrote:
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Now the time has come for the Armenian to live, put into effect, and 
bring into the light of day “civil disobedience,” meaning “disobedience 
of the government,” and to win his personal freedom from the oppres-
sion and fear of other powers and Armenia’s government.80
A group of exiled writers and intellectuals also expressed their posi-
tion regarding the electoral turmoil in Armenia. A declaration prepared 
by the group for a conference in support of democracy in Armenia that 
took place in Los Angeles on May 26 called for (1) the release of all po-
litical prisoners, (2) the creation of a provisional governing authority 
jointly with the opposition to oversee new presidential and parliamen-
tary elections, and (3) the return of all misappropriated state and private 
assets.81 The continued ban on public assemblies and demonstrations 
has indeed led to acts of civil disobedience as civil society organiza-
tions have had to resort to alternative—and often innovative—means 
of organizing public gathering, such as public walks (zbosanqner) on 
Northern Avenue. During these walks, participants read, ate, or plaid 
chess. Videos of some of the public walks are posted on YouTube and 
discussed on various blogs.
Despite the seemingly innocuous nature of those activities, police 
began detaining participants and in April 2009 the walks were halted 
by the authorities ahead of the May 2009 Yerevan mayoral election. 
Police began closely monitoring Northern Avenue to prevent it from 
becoming a public meeting space. Moreover, the ongoing construc-
tion in Liberty Square, where an underground parking garage is being 
built, has meant that the meeting space that was so fundamental to the 
struggle for independence in the late 1980s is no longer available for 
public meetings or other gatherings. Yet, the closing off of real/actual 
spaces is today accompanied by the opening of virtual spaces, including 
blogging sites. During the state of emergency, individuals began using 
new forms of communication technology, including camera-equipped 
mobile phones and Web 2.0 technologies such blogs, wikis82 and social 
networking (e.g., Facebook) and video-sharing (e.g., YouTube) websites 
to share and exchange information, opinions, photographs, and videos 
about the latest political developments. During the state of emergency, 
the use of these technologies allowed for the circumvention of the of-
ficial information blockade. That blockade did not stop discussion of 
politics; if anything, the flow of information, at least for those who had 
access to the Internet, went from a trickle to a tidal wave as news, com-
ments, photos, and videos were shared via blogs that were constantly 
updated. Some of the opposition sites, such as Payqar.org (“Struggle”), 
referred to their publications as “samizdat,”83 especially during the state 
of emergency, when access to the site was done via proxy server.
The number of posts and comments on the blogs dramatically in-
creased during the state of emergency, when there was otherwise a 
dearth of information. A few blogs, in particular Armenian Ditord and 
Oneworld Media, have reflected on the vibrancy and growing popular-
ity of Armenian blogs. The Armenian blogosphere is also discussed on 
a weekly Podcast from Radio Hay. Frequently updated blogs include 
the Armenian Ditord, Bekaisa, Caucasus Knot, Nazarian, Pigh, Seeti-
zen, Tzitzernak, Unzipped, and Uzogh. Such has been the popularity 
of these blogs that even Serge Sargsyan created his own blog on Live 
Journal and began encouraging people to write to him with questions 
and comments. Perhaps we shall see more presidential blogs in coming 
years, seeing that blogs are beginning to figure more prominently in 
elections around the world. For instance, in the US, all the presidential 
candidates had blogs that supported their campaign and fundraising 
efforts. President Barack Obama continues to use the Internet to send 
messages as well as video clips to his supporters asking for support of 
his initiatives.
The Armenian blogs tend to have a predominant language, either 
English or Russian, but also provide information in Armenian, English, 
and Russian. The multilingual blogs demonstrate the global reach of 
these technologies as well as the diversity of the participants. The blogs, 
while generating debate and discussion, also provide anonymity to the 
discussants. Although this leads to freer expression and discussion, it can 
and does mean that people at times hide behind fictitious identities.
YouTube in particular added a new dimension by hosting videos 
showing segments of demonstrations, fraud at polling stations, and 
discussions with people on the street. Having its license continually 
denied, A1+ created its own YouTube channel, which has consistently 
been among the most-watched channels on YouTube in the months fol-
lowing the election. The most widely circulated video during this pe-
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riod was a clip that showed masked gunmen firing live rounds in the 
direction of demonstrators. The scenes of the shooting were juxtaposed 
with excerpts from a spokeswoman from the Prosecutor General’s of-
fice stating that government forces did not shoot at demonstrators. 
Following the global circulation of the video, on 14 March 2008, the Ar-
menian government issued reports on public television that the video 
was a fake. These developments demonstrate how events online can 
have real-life consequences.
Given the limited access to the Internet in Armenia (by some esti-
mates it is 6 percent), questions remain as to how broad the participa-
tion is in online debates. Regardless of how widespread it might be, what 
is clear is that a politically engaged group of individuals is participating, 
and this trend can only grow as access to the Internet increases.
Conclusion
The minimalist or procedural definition of democracy is identified as 
originating with Joseph Schumpeter (1947), who argued that democ-
racy at the conceptual level is the existence of citizens holding their rul-
ers accountable and the existence of procedures by which to do so. This 
narrow approach focuses on the formal institutions of democracy and 
does not consider social and economic inequalities and how they affect 
participation, access, and decision-making. The problem with the pro-
cedural definition is that it ignores questions of inclusion, participa-
tion, deliberation, and diversity. Proponents of the broader, substantive 
conception of democracy argue that it is important to look beyond the 
formal institutions and to focus on the impact of structural inequali-
ties, power relations, and struggles by popular movements. Iris Marion 
Young, for instance, focuses on inclusion within democratic practices 
and argues that the normative legitimacy of a democratic decision de-
pends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in 
the decision-making processes and have had an opportunity to influ-
ence the outcomes.84
While procedural democratic institutions and mechanisms are 
necessary and in fact represent an a priori safeguard against the abuses 
of power and for the development of substantive democracy,85 there 
are many “managed” democracies where the procedural elements are 
present but substantive democracy is absent. “Managed democracy” 
(upravlyayemaya demokratiya) is a phrase adopted by the Russian au-
thorities in the early 2000s and is now increasingly used to describe the 
situation in other former Soviet states, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
and Kyrgyzstan. It refers to a situation in which the formal/procedural 
institutions and practices (e.g., elections) of democracies exist but are 
controlled and managed by the authorities.86
Thus, while recognizing the successes, we must be cautious in pre-
maturely proclaiming the triumph of democracy-promotion efforts. I 
argue that the results of democracy-building and civil society strength-
ening efforts in Armenia thus far have been varied. Policies aimed at 
strengthening democracy and civil society led to the establishment of 
the formal institutions, procedures, and mechanisms associated with 
democracy, including the holding of regularly scheduled elections and 
the existence of a large number of NGOs; however, if we consider the 
development and spread of substantive democracy, then it is clear that 
donor-supported democracy-building and civil society strengthening 
programs have not met with great success in Armenia. Because, al-
though the formal institutions, procedures, and mechanisms have been 
created, we are not witnessing greater civic participation, engagement, 
inclusion, and debate.
As I have demonstrated in this article, donor-based civil society 
strengthening programs led to the exponential growth of NGOs, but they 
also thwarted natural political processes and imposed a particular model 
of civil society. This tendency has led to the establishment of a genetically 
engineered civil society that consists of professionalized service-delivery 
and advocacy NGOs. Other academics have described foreign-funded 
civil society strengthening programs as leading to the “abortion of local 
processes of change”87 and the taming of social movements.88
Certainly NGOs have played a part in Armenia’s political, econom-
ic, and social development over the past 15 years; however, given their 
small size, continued dependence on foreign aid, limited access to the 
mass media, low membership numbers, and tendency to preach to 
the converted, their impact has been at the project or program level. 
Indeed, NGOs have designed and implemented some innovative and 
important projects, but they have not affected the broader political, 
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economic, and social context nor have they created a space for discus-
sion and debate. Yet today—as Armenia is faced with many important 
socioeconomic and political issues, including the impact of the global 
credit crunch, the push to find a resolution to the Karabakh conflict, 
and the attempts to normalize relations with Turkey—it is of utmost 
importance that civil society become more engaged in these discus-
sions and debates.
For that to happen, the government must not keep civil society in 
the dark regarding developments. Yet, while government officials en-
gage in behind-the-scenes negotiations about the status of Karabakh 
and the Turkish-Armenian border, civil society and the public at-large 
remain ignorant of the details of those negotiations that will undoubt-
edly affect their lives. For instance, what are the contents of the Madrid 
Principles or the 22 April 2009 Turkish Armenian Road Map? This lack 
of information led one UK-based civil society activist to write an open 
letter to the Armenian Catholicos requesting more information about 
these negotiations:
Everyday, different newspapers present us with different versions 
of the talks and negotiations held between the Leaders of our country 
[Armenia] with those of Azerbaijan and Turkey, yet most articles are 
contradicted by the negotiating parties; every day the Madrid Princi-
ples are mentioned and either refuted or agreed by the reporters, yet 
no one can tell us what—exactly—these principles are; everyday the 
setting-up of a joint committee to analyze the documents of the geno-
cide is reported and criticized, yet the authorities deny that agreement; 
and a map route for the opening of the borders between Armenia and 
Turkey is supposed to have been drawn yet no one has seen it and no 
one can describe it.
Where is the truth? ... Decisions which have to be taken now when 
Armenia is at this cross-roads and which will affect, irrevocably and 
forever, the lives of every man, woman and child in our Motherland and 
its Diaspora. We want to know.89
Armenia’s democratization is, has been, and will continue to be 
influenced to varying degrees by foreign donors, international NGOs, 
global civil society activists, and, of course, civil society organizations, 
political parties, and individuals from the Armenian Diaspora com-
munities in the US, Russia, and Western Europe. Civil society can be a 
space for participation, political debate, and the contestation (as well 
as reproduction) of hegemonic discourses. If we consider civil society 
as a site for struggle, diversity, and complexity instead of one where we 
find professionalized, tamed, technically savvy but apolitical NGOs, 
then we can identify the emancipatory potential for civil society. Yet 
the government, too, must play a part by both providing greater space 
for civil society to developing and by engaging in a more constructive 
manner with civil society organizations.
As Armenia approaches 20 years of independence, many questions 
remain about its future economic and political development. From 
very difficult beginnings, Armenia has significantly strengthened and 
rebuilt its economy and provided a level of stability and security for its 
citizens. How its future political, social, and economic developments 
will proceed is an open question. Armenia’s leaders face many impor-
tant political and diplomatic challenges around the issue of Turkish Ar-
menian rapprochement90 as well as the negotiations concerning the fu-
ture status of Karabakh. Much depends on Armenia’s leaders, but civil 
society actors must also have a role—but whether they will remains to 
be seen.
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The Limits and 
Opportunities 
of Civil Society in 
Conflict Resolution
The Case of  Nagorno-Karabakh
Irina Ghaplanyan
THE END of the Cold War was like Pandora’s Box in that it unleashed 
inter-ethnic grievances and revived dormant conflicts. The immediate 
emergence of intrastate wars also revealed the inability of the newly 
independent governments to effectively and constructively manage 
and contain conflicts. The violent response of those governments lent 
a degree of legitimacy to the secessionist states’ claim of sovereignty. 
As a result, the international community was unable to prioritize the 
two major international legal principles at the core of these post-Soviet 
conflicts: the right of national self-determination and the principle of 
territorial integrity.
The various strategies tailored individually and uniquely for 
each post-Soviet conflict have so far not resulted in successful shifts 
or outcomes. What these strategies have in common is the failure 
to effectively engage their respective civil societies in the conflict-
resolution processes.
The former Soviet states have largely been unable to build 
constructive state-society relations and substantially lag behind the 
Eastern European countries in terms of engaging civil society more 
deeply in the political and other state decision-making processes. 1 In 
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